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ment that settles outstanding disputes still seems far off. But 
this does not mean that steps toward better economic relations 
cannot be taken. Indeed, there was a major breakthrough in 
trade relations at the meeting between then President Pervez 
Musharraf of Pakistan and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
of India in New Delhi in April 2005 (Joint Communiqué 
2005). A number of trade-related issues were discussed at this 
meeting, and several key decisions were taken to move the 
process along. 
On  the  face  of  it,  the  Musharraf-Singh  2005  meeting 
was probably one of the most important meetings between 
India and Pakistan on trade issues and generated considerable 
optimism on both sides of the border about overall trade rela-
tions in the future. However, four years later most of the deci-
sions are being implemented very slowly, if at all, as political 
tensions, security issues, and domestic political opposition to 
the agreements continue to create obstacles. But now with a 
new Indian government and a relatively new democratically 
elected government in Pakistan, the timing may well be propi-
tious to revive and expand the “confidence-building” actions 
on the trade front that came out of the famous April 2005 
summit. While the Mumbai attacks severely strained relations 
between the two countries, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
and President Asif Ali Zardari had their first post–Mumbai 
attacks meeting on the sidelines of a regional summit in Yekat-
erinburg, Russia, on June 16, 2009, and a further meeting 
is planned at the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Egypt 
in July. Both leaders have stressed that it is in the vital inter-
est of the people of the subcontinent to have peace, and are 
apparently ready to engage on economic issues. Improving 
economic ties may help to resolve the larger political issues 
that have bedeviled India-Pakistan overall relations for over 
60 years.1
The potential gains from increased economic integration 
between India and Pakistan are large. Trade between the two 
countries is unnaturally small and the scope for gains from 
1. This has been stressed, for example, by Khan et al. (2007). See Murshed and 
Mamoon (2008) for a discussion of the various issues that have divided the 
two countries.
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Many previous attempts to improve economic ties between 
India  and  Pakistan  unfortunately  have  been  derailed  by 
periodically  heightened  political  tensions  between  the  two 
countries—be it Kargil in May 1999, the terrorist attack on 
the Indian Parliament in December 2001, or most recently, 
the Mumbai attacks in November 2008. Although successive 
Indian  and  Pakistani  governments  have  often  repeated  the 
desire for peaceful relations, reaching a comprehensive agree-N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 5   Ju l y   2 0 0 9
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increased trade correspondingly large.2 Currently, official trade 
is about $2 billion per year, up from a paltry $300 million a 
year in 2003–04.3 But still Pakistan accounts for less than 1 
percent of India’s trade and India accounts for under 5 percent 
of Pakistan’s trade compared with the very large trade shares 
following  independence  of  the  two  countries  in  1947:  In 
1948–49, 70 percent of Pakistan’s trading transactions were 
with India, while 63 percent of Indian exports went to Paki-
stan. Estimates from gravity models suggest that trade between 
the two countries could be 5 to10 times larger than the pres-
ent $2 billion per year, thereby raising GDP and household 
incomes in both countries.4 Informal trade, via third countries 
(such  as  the  United  Arab  Emirates,  specifically  Dubai),  is 
estimated at some $2 billion to $3 billion per year, and this 
trade could obviously be undertaken bilaterally at significantly 
lower cost. 
Constraints on economic integration include high tariff 
and nontariff barriers, inadequate infrastructure, bureaucratic 
inertia,  excessive  red  tape,  and  direct  political  opposition. 
Pakistan has not yet reciprocated most favored nation (MFN) 
status for India and maintains a fairly narrow positive list (786 
items) on goods that India may export to Pakistan. At the 
same time, India’s tariff rates remain high, especially for goods 
of particular interest to Pakistan, such as textiles, leather, and 
onyx, and nontariff barriers are substantial. Poor transportation 
linkages make trade costly, with railway and road connections 
inadequate  and  sea  shipments  constrained  by  both  limited 
port facilities and bureaucratic regulations and restrictions. 
Moreover,  constraints  on  visas  and  cumbersome  payments 
and customs procedures further limit scope for trade. Finally, 
although there are no specific restrictions, there is virtually 
2. As noted by the Confederation of Indian Industry (2005), Mukherjee 
(2005), Nabi and Nasim (2001), and Taneja (2006), among others. A very 
useful description of Pakistan’s trade relations with its South Asian neighbors, 
particularly India, is contained in Hufbauer and Burki (2006, appendix A).
3. As a point of reference, India and Sri Lanka have had a free trade agreement 
(FTA) since 2000, and total Indian–Sri Lankan trade is about $3 billion, even 
though Sri Lanka’s GDP is roughly a quarter that of Pakistan. Sri Lanka and 
Pakistan also signed an FTA in July 2002, which became operational in 2005.
4. This is based on the estimates made by Batra (2004) and Kemal, Abbas, and 
Qadir (2002). 
no trade in services or foreign direct investment (FDI) flows 
between the two countries. In both the cases of services and 
FDI, prior government approval has to be obtained, and it is 
clear that such approvals have been granted very sparingly by 
either country.
A StrAtegy for IncreASIng trAde
Before  undertaking  more  long-term  fundamental  reforms, 
both countries need to build public support for trade liber-
alization. Initial steps should focus on bilateral measures that 
can  be  accomplished  relatively  easily—by  executive  order 
rather than via legislation and with minimal resource implica-
tions—and that would meaningfully increase trade while gain-
ing support for bigger and bolder steps down the line. While a 
few of the measures proposed here fall under the ambit of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and have to be handled in 
a multilateral setting, most would involve only bilateral agree-
ments between the two countries.
Appendix 1 presents a summary of the main tariff and 
nontariff barriers to trade between India and Pakistan. Reduc-
ing these barriers and eventually achieving regional integra-
tion could involve two phases: short term (6–12 months) and 
medium term (1–3 years).
first Phase: Short-term Measures
Many of the short-term measures proposed here were agreed 
in principle at the Musharraf-Singh meeting. However, the 
agreements were limited in scope and, even so, were not fully 
implemented. Since the issues are well known and have been 
discussed at length by both sides, it should be possible to move 
ahead rapidly on expanding and implementing the measures 
if the political will is there. The specific short-term measures, 
mainly relating to trade facilitation, could include:
n	 Easing restrictions on visas, specifically, allowing multiple-
entry visas for businessmen, eliminating requirements to 
report arrival to the police at each place of stay, eliminating 
city-specific visas, and speeding up the approval processes;
n	 Signing a protocol to permit Indian/Pakistani ships to lift 
cargo for third countries and eliminating the reciprocal 
requirement that ships touch a third-country port before 
bringing  in  imports.  The  third-country  port  restriction 
particularly  affects  trade  of  high-bulk,  low-value  goods, 
such as coal, tar, and cement, making their transportation 
via sea commercially unviable. Also allowing sea shipments 
in addition to the current Mumbai-Karachi route;
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n	 Eliminating the reciprocal requirement that rail wagons 
carrying goods across the border return empty, increasing 
the frequency of rail traffic, and improving the coordina-
tion  between  the  railway  authorities.  Businessmen  have 
suggested restarting the old Sindh-Rajasthan rail link;
n	 Opening  additional  border  crossings,  increasing  traffic 
frequency on the road route through the Wagah border 
(connecting the major cities of Amritsar and Lahore)5 and 
the Khokhrapar-Munabao route, and allowing increased 
traffic  through  the  Srinagar-Muzzafarabad  route,  which 
is currently restricted to only four trucks from either side 
crossing once a week;
n	 Opening  additional  bus  routes.  The  Musharraf-Singh 
meeting in April 2005 yielded a commitment to increase 
the  frequency  of  the  cross-Kashmir  bus  service  via  the 
Srinagar-Muzzafarabad route. However, the bus service is 
only weekly and restricted to passengers who have relatives 
on the other side of the border;
n	 Increasing air links between the two countries. Currently, 
the  only  air  links  agreed  are  Lahore–New  Delhi,  Kara-
chi–New Delhi, and Karachi-Mumbai. There is no direct 
air link between the two capitals (Islamabad–New Delhi);
n	 Increasing the number of customs posts where “sensitive” 
items  can  be  cleared  and  eliminating  requirement  for 
100 percent verification; and
n	 Allowing branches of Indian and Pakistani banks to oper-
ate in the other country and allowing banks in one country 
to hold accounts in the currency of the other.
Second Phase: Medium-term Measures 
The short-term measures outlined above should provide the 
stepping stones to move to more fundamental reforms in trade 
relations between the two countries. Over the medium term, 
the key measures would be for Pakistan to grant MFN status to 
India, which India has already provided to Pakistan, and allow 
transit trade from India. These would be accompanied by India 
reducing tariff rates on goods of particular interest to Pakistan 
and removing nontariff barriers, including in agriculture. The 
authorities should also seek to agree on steps to harmonize—or 
at least make more transparent—customs procedures and prod-
uct standards. To the extent that regulations or government 
5. The Attari-Wagah border closes at 2pm every day in preparation for the 
“retreat” ceremony when Indian and Pakistani flags are lowered at sunset. 
Therefore, an alternative, possibly parallel, truck route is needed.
practices  constrain  FDI  and  services  trade,  an  end  to  these 
constraints should be negotiated. Eliminating double taxation 
would also boost the attractiveness of cross-border investments. 
These steps would greatly expand the scope of integration, with 
potentially large efficiency gains on both sides.
The South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), which 
came into effect in January 2006, provides a framework for 
removing  some  obstacles  to  trade,  but  its  implementation 
alone would likely not dramatically improve economic integra-
tion. SAFTA calls for tariff rates within the region to decline 
to zero by 2012, but it is highly unlikely that this target will 
be met. Currently, tariff rates in India are significantly higher 
than those in Pakistan (appendix 1). In particular, India’s high 
tariffs on agricultural products and textiles severely discourage 
Pakistan’s exports to India. The Pakistanis believe that these 
tariffs are implicitly targeted at their country, whose potential 
exports  would  mainly  include  these  two  items  (e.g.,  cotton 
yarn and fruits and vegetables).6 Beyond this slow pace of tariff 
reductions, benefits will depend on exactly how the agreement 
is implemented. In particular, an agreement with fewer and 
simpler rules of origin and small negative lists would be benefi-
cial. However, the negative lists in both countries are thought 
to be quite extensive. Moreover, SAFTA does not cover services 
and investments.7 Thus, broader bilateral measures remain very 
important.
Finally,  infrastructure  in  both  countries  needs  to  be 
significantly  improved  and  harmonized:  Roads  need  to  be 
expanded and upgraded, and ports need to be modernized. 
Both  countries  are  seeking  ways  within  their  overall  fiscal 
constraints to move rapidly on these fronts. Improving regu-
latory frameworks for key infrastructure sectors would help 
attract the private sector to participate in improving infra-
structure in both countries. In addition, the scope for trade in 
6. In addition to pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, and sporting goods.
7. Unlike in the case of goods, under the WTO rules, countries maintain a 
positive list of services for trade. Pakistan has such a positive list, but it does 
not discriminate against India.
Constraints on economic integration 
include high tariff and nontariff 
barriers, inadequate infrastructure, 
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energy appears to be sizeable, and eventually both countries 
could work on developing a joint energy grid.
The  specific  medium-term  measures  toward  greater 
economic  integration  between  India  and  Pakistan  could 
include:
n	 Within the framework of SAFTA, Pakistan should agree 
with India on as limited as possible lists of sensitive items. 
Both Pakistan and India should apply MFN duty rates to 
items on the sensitive lists.
n	 India should significantly lower tariff rates for goods of 
particular interest to Pakistan (e.g., textiles, leather, and 
onyx) and remove nontariff barriers. In return, Pakistan 
should  follow  WTO  rules  and  reciprocate  by  provid-
ing MFN status to India and abolishing the positive list 
approach.8
n	 Pakistan  should  allow  transit  trade  from  India.  WTO 
rules require Pakistan to allow transit trade for all goods to 
and from third countries (including Afghanistan and the 
countries in Central Asia). Pakistan views this as problem-
atic because of the risk that goods “dumped” by India in 
Afghanistan will reenter Pakistan, and as such transit trade 
from India has been restricted.
n	 Energy trade between the two countries should be facili-
tated. The greatest benefit would occur in the sphere of 
energy  cooperation. To  start  with,  the  countries  could 
agree on the gas pipeline between Iran and India pass-
ing through Pakistan. This would assure India of a regu-
lar supply of gas, and Pakistan would earn transit fees 
(estimated at about $800 million a year), in addition to 
meeting  its  own  energy  needs.  While  recognizing  the 
geopolitical problems associated with this particular proj-
ect, specifically US opposition in the context of sanctions 
against Iran, it should be noted that Iran and Pakistan have 
recently reached agreement on a gas pipeline, so the neces-
sary infrastructure up to India’s border will be in place. Of 
course, it would require the United States to waive its Iran 
sanctions for India to agree to proceed with the project. 
In the longer term, the development of joint energy grids, 
particularly in the Punjab-Haryana and Sindh-Rajasthan 
regions, would create efficiencies through economies of 
scale and lower energy costs for both countries.
n	 Both  countries  should  also  allow  trade  in  information 
technology (IT). Despite India being well ahead of Paki-
stan in this field, both countries could engage in mutu-
ally beneficial business-to-business links. Since IT trade 
8. The view of some Pakistani politicians and bureaucrats is that MFN status 
for India should be linked to the resolution of the Kashmir issue. Interestingly, 
this view is not necessarily shared by the Pakistani business community, which 
argues rightly that trade should not be held hostage to the Kashmir solution.
does not involve movement of goods, it would be easier 
to move ahead quickly in this area. For example, Pakistan 
could allow large Indian IT companies to set up call centers 
and other IT-related firms, taking advantage of the existing 
(and growing) English-speaking workforce in Pakistan.
n	 Both  countries  should  harmonize  their  customs  proce-
dures, including more standardized and transparent docu-
ments and inspection procedures and product standards. 
Also,  sanitary  and  safety  laboratory  inspections  in  one 
country should be accepted in the other.
n	 Obstacles to FDI flows, other than restrictions based on 
national security grounds, in both directions should be 
eased  and  obtaining  government  approval  streamlined. 
Each country’s companies should be allowed to float shares 
in the securities markets of the other, and double taxation 
on corporate and individual incomes should be removed.
ConClusion
With new governments in both India and Pakistan, there is once 
again a window of opportunity to improve economic ties. While 
the measures for reducing trade barriers proposed in this brief 
generally have the support of businessmen on both sides of the 
border, it is critical to build constituencies in each country for 
greater bilateral trade liberalization.9 The success of the “confi-
dence building” short-term measures and the resulting growth 
in trade would give a major impetus to the creation of vested 
interests that would support more far-reaching liberalization of 
trade between the two countries.  Only then will the political 
and bureaucratic opposition to increased India-Pakistan trade 
be diminished. Trade will of course not solve all the problems 
between the two countries, but it could be an important catalyst   
in the lowering of tensions. And a lowering of tensions between 
India  and  Pakistan—an  inevitable  benefit  of  strengthened 
economic ties—would improve the security climate for invest-
ment and economic development in both countries. It is clearly 
in the interest of both countries, and the world for that matter, 
to find a political resolution to the India-Pakistan problem, and 
increased trade can well be the starting point for this objective. 
In the case of India-Pakistan trade relations, good fences do not 
make good neighbors!
9. Earlier fears in Pakistan that Indian exports would overwhelm the domestic 
production of manufactures have eased over time as Pakistani businessmen 
have realized that they can compete in a number of areas, such as agro-industry 
products, textiles, and surgical instruments, if there is a level playing field.N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 5                                                                                                                   Ju l y   2 0 0 9
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Appendix 1     Barriers to trade between India and Pakistan
Barriers to trade India Pakistan
                                                                                                                       tariff barriers
Most favored nation (MFN) status Has granted MFN to Pakistan. Not granted MFN to India; imports from India 
restricted to positive list (78 items); most of the 
permissible items are chemicals, minerals, and 
metal products; finished products are not part of 
the list; no special restrictions on exports to India.
Unweighted average customs duty . percent 1.9 percent
Nonagriculture 19.7 percent 1.8 percent
Agriculture 0.1 percent 0. percent
General maximum customs duty 0 percent (0 percent, excluding agriculture).  percent
Special higher duties For 18. percent of tariff lines: rates of  to 
18 percent (agriculture, automobiles, textiles, and 
garments).
For 1.1 percent of tariff lines: rates of 0 to 
0 percent (edible oil, automobiles, and alcohol).
India has extended tariff concessions to Pakistan on 
9 items.
Pakistan has extended tariff concessions to India 
on 8 items; until recently 78 of these items could 
not be imported because they were on the banned 
list, but these items have since been added to the 
positive list.
                                                                                                                   nontariff barriers
Import licensing Dismantled; no registration, licensing fees, and 
quotas.
Dismantled; no registration, licensing fees, and 
quotas.
Subsidies India provides significant subsidies to producers 
and consumers (mainly in agriculture).
Few subsidies except urea fertilizer and electricity 
to households, but subsidies through support 
prices (wheat and cotton).
Visa regimes Very restrictive; visas take a long time to process 
and for a particular city, Pakistani nationals are 
required to register themselves upon entry into 
India and also have to report their arrival to and 
intended departure from each place of stay as 
permitted on the visa within  hours at the 
nearest police station.
Very restrictive for Indians; police reporting 
required, but recently, some relaxation has 
occurred, with multiple-entry visas being granted 
to Indian businessmen when arranged through the 
Chambers of Commerce.
Land transportation Few border crossings; very limited rail traffic across 
borders; and requirement that rail wagons carrying 
goods across the border should return empty.
Few border crossings; very limited rail traffic across 
borders; and requirement that rail wagons carrying 
goods across the border should return empty.
Air travel Still limited, but some improvement in recent years. Still limited, but some improvement in recent years.
Sea transportation Ships must first touch a third-country port to 
import from Pakistan (i.e., Dubai or Singapore); 
limited ports and inland customs posts at which 
the import of “sensitive” products can be cleared.
Ships must first touch a third-country port to 
import from India (i.e., Dubai or Singapore); 
Pakistan has only one major port in operation 
(Karachi).
Payment systems No branches of Indian banks in Pakistan; payments 
for exports/imports have to be made through 
third-country banks.
No branches of Pakistani banks in India; payments 
for exports/imports have to be made through 
third-country banks.
Energy trade No energy trade with Pakistan. No energy trade with India.
Services/information technology (IT) Trade with Pakistan in services and IT is heavily 
restricted.
Trade with India in services and IT is heavily 
restricted.